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Equity Crowdfunding, Shareholder Structures, and Firm Performance 
ABSTRACT 
Manuscript Type: Empirical 
Research Question/Issue: This paper provides a first-time glimpse into the post-campaign 
financial and innovative performance of equity-crowdfunded (ECF) and matched non-equity-
crowdfunded (NECF) firms. We further investigate how direct and nominee shareholder 
structures in ECF firms are associated with firm performance.  
Research Findings/Insights: We find that ECF firms have 8.5 times higher failure rates than 
matched NECF firms. However, 3.4 times more ECF firms have patent applications than 
matched NECF firms. Within the group of ECF firms, we find that ECF firms financed 
through a nominee structure make smaller losses, while ECF firms financed through a direct 
shareholder structure have more new patent applications, including foreign patent 
applications. 
Theoretical/Academic Implications: Our findings suggest that there are important adverse 
selection issues on equity crowdfunding platforms, although these platforms also serve as a 
catalyst for innovative activities. Moreover, our findings suggest that there is a more complex 
relationship between dispersed versus concentrated crowd shareholders and firm performance 
than currently assumed in the literature. 
Practitioner/Policy Implications: For policymakers and crowdfunding platforms, investor 
protection against adverse selection will be important to ensure the sustainability of equity 
crowdfunding markets. For entrepreneurs and crowd investors, our study highlights how 
equity crowdfunding and the adopted shareholder structure relate to short-term firm 
performance. 
Keywords: Equity Crowdfunding, Corporate Governance, Direct Shareholder 
Structure, Nominee Structure, Firm Performance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Entrepreneurs require financial resources to form and grow their firms, yet internal funds are 
rarely sufficient to fuel entrepreneurs’ aspired growth (e.g., Cassar, 2004; Cosh et al., 2009; 
Vanacker & Manigart, 2010). Moreover, young and small firms often experience significant 
problems in acquiring external funds (Berger & Udell, 1998; Carpenter & Petersen, 2002)—
problems that have worsened after the global financial crisis (Block & Sandner, 2009; 
Cowling et al., 2012). More recently, crowdfunding represents a ‘new’ source of financing 
that plays a progressively more important role in the financing of entrepreneurial firms 
(Bellavitis et al., 2017; Block et al., 2018a; Bruton et al., 2015; Cumming & Vismara, 2017; 
Fleming & Sorenson, 2016; Short et al., 2017). 
 In line with the increasing popularity of crowdfunding, scholarly research has 
followed suit with early research mainly focusing on (a) identifying success factors in raising 
different types of crowdfunding and (b) funding dynamics on crowdfunding platforms (e.g., 
Ahlers et al., 2015; Allison et al., 2015, 2017; Block et al., 2018b; Butticè et al., 2017; Chan 
& Parhankangas, 2017; Colombo et al., 2015; Courtney et al., 2017; Davis et al., 2017; 
Giudici et al., 2018; Mollick, 2014; Vismara, 2016, 2018; Vulkan et al., 2016). Scholars have 
also started exploring post-campaign outcomes, with a primary focus on the follow-on 
funding and survival of projects funded through reward-based crowdfunding platforms (e.g., 
Butticè et al., 2017; Colombo & Shafi, 2016; Mollick, 2014; Mollick & Kuppuswamy, 2014). 
Few studies, however, have focused on the outcomes of firms funded through equity 
crowdfunding1, which is fundamentally different from reward-based crowdfunding (Vismara, 
2018). Notable exceptions include Drover et al. (2017), Hornuf and Schmitt (2017), and 
Signori and Vismara (2018). In particular, these studies have examined follow-on 
fundraising, failures, and exits.2 We build on and extend this stream of research by providing 
a dynamic picture of firm financial and innovative performance and by comparing the 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
performance of equity-crowdfunded firms to similar firms that have raised other sources of 
capital. Finally, equity crowdfunding platforms adopt different shareholder structures 
(Hornuf & Schwienbacher, 2018), but we lack an insight on how this heterogeneity relates to 
firm performance (Cumming & Wright, 2017). 
We address these gaps and ask the following related research questions: How do 
equity crowdfunded (ECF) firms perform relative to matched non-equity crowdfunded 
(NECF) firms that raised other forms of capital? And, how do ECF firms financed through a 
direct shareholder structure perform relative to ECF firms financed through a nominee 
structure? How ECF firms perform is a critical question because corporate governance issues 
may be particularly important in this setting. Indeed, equity crowdfunding is the only form of 
crowdfunding where a potentially large number of new shareholders enter the firm (Bruton et 
al., 2015). Moreover, contrary to reward-based campaigns that are launched mostly by 
individuals and often represent artistic projects that generally do not relate to a firm, in equity 
crowdfunding the proponent is always a firm (Vismara, 2018). Finally, the equity 
crowdfunding context is characterized by significant information asymmetries, where small 
crowd investors may have limited resources and incentives to perform detailed due diligence 
and monitoring activities (Ahlers et al., 2015).  
Our research also connects and contributes to a broader literature. First, a large 
literature has shown that ownership type and structure may substantially affect firm 
performance (e.g., Dalton et al., 2003; Kumar & Zattoni, 2017). Within the domain of equity 
financing, for instance, studies have shown that there are significant differences in the post-
investment growth and failure rates of venture capital-backed versus non-venture-capital-
backed firms (Manigart et al., 2002; Puri & Zarutskie, 2012). Similarly, others have shown 
differences in the post-investment evolution of angel-backed versus non-angel-backed firms 
(Collewaert et al., 2010). However, findings from these studies are not necessarily 
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generalizable to ECF firms because various differences exist between traditional outside 
equity financing, and equity crowdfunding. For example, while traditional outside equity 
investors often rely on detailed due diligence to reduce adverse selection issues, equity 
crowdfunding relies on the wisdom of the crowd (Schwienbacher & Larralde, 2012). 
Moreover, while outside equity investors are often actively involved in their portfolio firms to 
reduce potential moral hazard issues and to add value, equity crowd investors are more 
passive within the firms they finance (Block et al., 2018a). Still, equity crowd investors may 
provide valuable feedback and become brand ambassadors for the firm and its products 
(Schwienbacher & Larralde, 2012). In this paper, we will thus provide a first-time glimpse 
into how ECF firms perform relative to NECF firms that raised other forms of capital.3 
 Second, not all equity crowdfunding is the same and the equity crowdfunding context 
provides a unique context for examining different shareholder structures in young 
entrepreneurial firms (e.g., Cumming & Wright, 2017). As Filatotchev and Wright (2017: 11) 
observe “in studies on entrepreneurial firms there is oftentimes a lack of recognition of the 
different ownership structures and goals which may affect the structure and processes of 
governance”. In this paper, we compare the performance of firms that received equity 
crowdfunding through a direct shareholder structure, wherein crowd investors become legal 
shareholders of the business they support, to the performance of firms that received equity 
crowdfunding through a nominee structure, wherein equity crowdfunding platforms hold and 
manage the shares of the supported firms on behalf of the crowd investors. This comparison 
will further allow us to provide new insights into the benefits of concentrated versus 
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HYPOTHESES 
Equity Crowdfunding and Firm Performance 
There are several reasons to expect that ECF firms might outperform NECF firms that raised 
other sources of capital. These reasons include equity crowdfunding’s unique selection 
mechanism—“the wisdom of crowds”—and extra-financial benefits. 
First, firms that successfully raise equity crowdfunding survived “the wisdom of the 
crowd”; this principle entails that the crowd displays more wisdom than an individual (even 
an expert) when solving problems or making decisions (Schwienbacher & Larralde, 2012; 
Surowiecki, 2005). The wisdom of the crowd effect relies on filtering out noise in individual 
problem solving, by averaging over large numbers and thereby canceling out the effect of 
individual noise (Surowiecki, 2005). While wisdom of the crowd effects have been primarily 
examined for relatively simple problems that require single estimates, there is evidence that 
this effect is also valid for problems or decision making that require the coordination of 
multiple pieces of information (Yi et al., 2012), such as investment decision making.  
Moreover, recently, there is also evidence of wisdom of crowd effects in reward-
based crowdfunding (Mollick & Nanda, 2016) and lending-based crowdfunding (Iyer et al., 
2015) contexts. Mollick and Nanda (2016), for instance, find large agreement between the 
funding decisions of crowds and experts related to theatre projects. In addition, they fail to 
find quantitative or qualitative differences between projects selected by the crowd alone and 
those selected by both the crowd and experts. Thus, while each individual crowd investor 
may have relatively limited resources (such as industry knowledge) and economic incentives 
to perform due diligence, combined, the crowd could succeed in selecting firms with greater 
financial and innovative potential. After all, multiple perspectives and backgrounds should 
foster smarter decision making in ways that simple experience or knowledge does not 
(Mollick & Nanda, 2016; Mollick & Robb, 2016).4 Generally speaking, the benefits of speed, 
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scale, and diversity in experience and background of crowd investors ensure a unique 
selection mechanism that may be superior to that of any individual even when that individual 
is an expert. These wisdom of the crowd effects thus entail that crowds can select firms with 
greater financial and innovative potential, which in turn could result in better post-investment 
performance for ECF firms compared to NECF firms that did not undergo such crowd 
scrutiny.  
Second, next to its unique selection mechanism, equity crowdfunding may have non-
financial benefits that contribute to firm performance. For example, the equity crowdfunding 
campaign provides a forum from which ECF firms may obtain valuable feedback 
(Belleflamme et al., 2014). In general, the value of customer feedback and the importance of 
leveraging the crowd for the development of products and services has long been recognized 
in the marketing and innovation management literature (e.g., Lovelock & Young, 1979; 
Gruner & Gomburg, 2000; Prahalad & Ramaswamy, 2004, Mahr et al., 2013). By 
incorporating (prospective) customer preferences into new products or services ECF firms 
might foster new product success and spur firm innovation (e.g., Joshi & Sharma, 2004). 
Especially, firms that suffer from liabilities of newness and smallness would benefit from 
customer participation (Chang & Taylor, 2016).  
Even though crowd investors are investors, and thus sensu stricto not customers, there 
is evidence that their behavior conforms to customer participation as they invest to become 
part of the entrepreneurial firm. Indeed, recent studies highlight that crowdfunding 
participants are intrinsically motivated to take an active role in the innovation conversation 
(e.g., Stanko & Henard, 2017). Supporting their knowledge contribution, some crowdfunding 
participants have been granted advisory board positions because of their exceptional 
knowledge and experience. Also, various entrepreneur testimonials echo that engaged crowd 
investors offer more than just money; entrepreneurs acknowledge that they solicited the 
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crowd for feedback and responded to this feedback with adjustments to product design, 
marketing and pricing strategies to ensure a timely and successful commercialization (Grell et 
al., 2015). Moreover, Schwienbacher and Larralde (2012) argue that investors can become 
ambassadors and may “crowd-brand” the company to others, thereby spurring 
commercialization. Finally, successful equity crowdfunding campaigns can create market 
awareness and visibility (Schwienbacher & Larralde, 2012), which is often essential for 
young and small firms that need to attract additional resources to support their development 
(Vanacker & Forbes, 2016). 
NECF firms that raise other sources of capital may also benefit from extra-financial 
resources. For instance, venture capital and angel investors provide value-adding services 
(e.g., Sapienza et al., 1996). However, it is important to acknowledge two points. First, 
research findings on the performance effects of receiving venture capital are mixed. In their 
meta-analysis, Rosenbusch et al. (2013) synthesize 76 empirical samples on 36,567 firms and 
find only a negligible effect of venture capital on firm financial performance. Second, and 
more importantly, the majority of firms do not raise venture capital or angel investments 
(Cosh et al., 2009); they are unable or unwilling to do so.5 Thus, new capital generally comes 
from additional investments made by the entrepreneurs themselves, family members or 
friends. These (internal) sources of capital generally do not provide extra-financial benefits. 
Combined, the extra-financial benefits in NECF firms that raise other sources of capital are 
generally very limited. 
Taken together, equity crowdfunding’s unique selection mechanisms and/or extra-
financial benefits should enhance an ECF firm’s financial and innovative performance 
relative to NECF firms that raise capital from other sources. Thus,  
Hypothesis 1. ECF firms will exhibit higher (a) financial and (b) innovative 
performance, relative to matched NECF firms that raised other sources of capital. 
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Shareholder Structures and Firm Performance in Equity Crowdfunding 
Not all equity crowdfunding platforms work in the same way, however (Cumming & Wright, 
2017; Hornuf & Schwienbacher, 2018). Specifically, shareholder structures may vary across 
equity crowdfunding platforms. One possibility is a direct shareholder structure wherein each 
crowd investor becomes a direct shareholder of the firm he or she funds. Another possibility 
is the nominee structure wherein the crowd is represented by one legal shareholder (i.e. the 
nominee) who holds the shares on behalf of the crowd investors. While some equity 
crowdfunding platforms use a nominee structure, others use a direct shareholder structure. 
It is widely accepted in the corporate governance literature that concentrated 
ownership—associated with a nominee structure—reduces agency costs and, as such, results 
in improved firm performance (e.g., Barry et al., 1990; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997). This positive effect is mainly due to more efficient monitoring: higher 
ownership concentration makes it easier to act collectively because one has more incentive 
and power to monitor management. Moreover, as there are simply fewer owners to 
coordinate with, high ownership concentration is associated with lower coordination costs 
(Dharwadkar et al., 2000). We argue that a similar argument holds in equity crowdfunding 
and hence that ECF firms financed through a nominee structure should outperform ECF firms 
financed through a direct shareholder structure. 
One of the key mechanisms through which investors can mitigate agency conflicts is 
through monitoring. In a direct shareholder structure, however, many small crowd investors 
may not only lack the power, but also the economic incentives to monitor (Ahlers et al., 
2015). For individual crowd investors, it simply does not make economic sense to bear 
significant monitoring costs (even if they would have the power to influence management) 
given their relatively small investments and the possibility that others free-ride on their 
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monitoring activities (e.g., Hart, 1995). Thus, the monitoring of management in ECF firms 
financed through a direct shareholder structure might be less than optimal. 
Moreover, in a direct shareholder structure, the firm is expected to be faced with more 
constraints and expenses. First, the process of shareholder approval will be more complex, 
formalistic, expensive and lengthier. Shareholder approval is required for events such as 
director elections, fundamental changes to the constituent instruments of the company, 
recapitalizations, sales of significant assets and mergers. Consider, for instance, a typical firm 
raising £200,000 via equity crowdfunding from 144 backers in a direct shareholder structure. 
The large majority (75%) of crowd investors have voting rights (Signori & Vismara, 2018). 
When the firm would need follow-on financing, depending on the articles of association, all 
144 crowd investors might need to be consulted, and crowd investors who are entitled to vote 
(let’s assume 75%, i.e. 108 individual investors) would need to sign and return a document to 
the firm. Some shareholders may be quite passive investors and therefore may have to be 
contacted repeatedly to get their approval. Moreover, the more ownership becomes dispersed, 
the more challenging it will be to align the interests of all crowd investors (Wang et al. 2015); 
i.e. they may simply disagree on what they consider to be the best solution. All of this 
combined results in a more costly decision-making process compared to a situation where the 
firm would only need to deal with one shareholder, as would be the case in a nominee 
structure.  
Second, to get shareholder approval firms need to maintain a proper and up-to-date 
shareholder list. Again, maintaining such a list will likely be more complex and will take a lot 
of the entrepreneur’s time and effort in a direct shareholder structure. This is an important 
issue as failing to properly maintain such a shareholder register may result in more 
professional investors shying away from the firm for follow-on financing. Moreover, being 
aware of the agency conflicts in a direct ownership structure and the complexity of 
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shareholder management as described above, professional investors may be reluctant to 
invest in such firms (e.g., Drover et al., 2017). Indeed, a direct shareholder structure that 
results in more complex capitalization tables makes the administration and negotiation in 
financing rounds and exits more difficult. Further, for professional investors it is imperative 
that their portfolio companies scale quickly (Puri & Zarutskie, 2012). Interacting with and 
convincing many separate crowdinvestors (rather than one nominee) may thus decrease 
decision speed and the odds of scaling successfully. Overall, there are several reasons why 
professional investors may be reluctant to provide follow-on financing to firms with 
dispersed crowd shareholders. Still, such financing may be crucial for firms to foster their 
development and allow them to exploit innovations.6 
In contrast, a nominee structure has clear advantages compared to the direct 
shareholder structure. All else equal, given that nominees manage all crowd shares, they have 
more power and incentives to monitor relative to individual crowd investors. The individuals 
or firms that serve as nominees generally share in the value that is created at exit explaining 
their increased monitoring incentive. The fact that a firm only has to deal with one 
shareholder (i.e. the nominee) may further result in distinct effectiveness to reach shareholder 
approval. Nominee structures can thus be a means to create incentive alignment between 
crowd investors. In a nominee structure, the nominee also takes the role of legal 
representative, who has the capacity to make decisions on behalf of crowd investors. For 
example, in most cases, nominees have special rights (such as drag along and tag along 
rights) that allow them to make decisions for crowd investors when follow-on financing or an 
exit has to be negotiated. A nominee structure may, therefore, be a particularly important 
governance structure that enhances firm performance by reducing the negative effects arising 
from the agency conflicts in a direct ownership structure. Moreover, a nominee structure may 
lower coordination costs related to a dispersed direct ownership structure.  
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
Of course, if a nominee structure would only have advantages relative to a direct 
ownership structure, all entrepreneurs would choose that structure and it would be the only 
one we would observe. An advantage of the direct shareholder structure, and a particularly 
potent reason why entrepreneurs may prefer it, is that it allows entrepreneurs to retain more 
control over their firms. Entrepreneurs generally value control (Sapienza et al., 2003), and 
when each crowd investor is a direct shareholder, all else equal, they will have less power to 
influence entrepreneurs relative to a block of crowd shareholders that are managed and 
coordinated by a nominee. While retaining more control is valuable from the perspective of 
the entrepreneur, it does not necessarily benefit firm performance due to agency issues 
described above. Direct shareholdership might also foster “a feeling of belonging” by being 
more directly involved in an entrepreneurial firm (Belleflamme et al., 2014: 589). Such more 
direct involvement could benefit the provision of extra-financial resources from a broader, 
more diverse set of people, which could be particularly influential to obtain new ideas or 
perspectives. Ultimately, the disadvantages of a direct shareholder structure (i.e., agency 
conflicts and coordination costs) relate to such central issues in entrepreneurial finance and 
corporate governance that they are likely to outweigh the advantages of such a structure for 
firm performance. Thus, 
Hypothesis 2. Within the group of ECF firms, firms that are financed through a 
nominee structure will exhibit higher (a) financial and (b) innovative performance, 
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METHOD 
Empirical Setting 
In this section, we provide details on our empirical setting. We start with discussing equity 
crowdfunding and shareholder rights in the UK. We then further discuss the two UK-based 
platforms that we use for the purpose of our study, namely Crowdcube and Seedrs. 
Equity crowdfunding and shareholder rights in the UK. Our empirical setting is 
the equity crowdfunding market in the UK, the largest and most developed equity 
crowdfunding market in Europe. The UK accounted for nearly 40% of the global equity 
crowdfunding market in 2016. Hence, this setting provides us with sufficient firms that raised 
equity crowdfunding (e.g., Harrison, 2013; Ralcheva & Roosenboom, 2016; Signori & 
Vismara, 2018; Vismara, 2016, 2018; Vulkan et al., 2016; Walthoff-Borm et al., 2018). 
Moreover, the UK has established equity crowdfunding platforms that operate through a 
direct shareholder structure, a nominee structure, or a combination of both. Finally, the UK 
setting provides accounting data on small, privately held firms (Walthoff-Borm et al., 2018). 
This data is crucial for our research because it allows us to track the performance of ECF 
firms and matched NECF firms over time. 
 Previous research has provided an excellent description of equity crowdfunding 
regulations in different countries including the UK (Hornuf & Schwienbacher, 2017; 
Vismara, 2016). The types of shares that firms issue through equity crowdfunding campaigns 
are generally ordinary shares. Share rights are set out in the firm’s articles of association and 
can entitle shareholders to dividends, participation in meetings of the firm, and voting rights 
(Vismara, 2016). The 2006 UK’s Companies Act gives shareholders particular rights.7 For 
example, private firms do not need to hold an annual general meeting, but minority 
shareholders with at least 5% of the total voting rights are able to require the firm to call a 
general meeting.8 If shareholders wish to have more information about the proposed content 
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of the meeting, those representing at least 5% of the total voting rights may also require the 
firm to circulate a statement of up to 1,000 words providing detail on the matters to be 
considered. Minority shareholders holding more than 10% of the shares also have the right to 
prevent a meeting from being held on short notice. Besides, they have the right to have the 
firm’s annual accounts audited, at the firm’s expense, even when the firm is exempted from 
an audit. This request must be made in writing and arrive at least one month before the end of 
the financial year that the audit is being asked for. The bundle of rights as minority 
shareholders is thus dependent on the percentage of the total voting rights or total shares. 
Further, company directors must often pass a resolution granting authority to allot new 
shares. If a decision is thought to be unfairly prejudicial to minority shareholders (e.g., in 
case of severe down rounds without compelling disclosures), a shareholder may bring an 
“unfair prejudice” claim. There is no minimum shareholding level for bringing such an 
action.9  
 The shares crowd investors purchase are difficult to trade (Signori & Vismara, 2018). 
Recently though, equity crowdfunding platforms have started to experiment to increase 
liquidity. Some crowdfunding platforms with nominee structures have launched secondary 
markets. For example, Seedrs enables investors to trade shares at “fair value” to current 
investors in a given firm and when the firm is not subject to a major corporate transaction. 
Other platforms, such as Crowdcube, have organized an on-platform secondary share trade. 
In theory, crowd investors can also try to find an interested buyer to sell their shares to, 
subject to the firm’s articles of association, but finding interested buyers is a major challenge.  
 Crowdcube and Seedrs. We focus on Crowdcube and Seedrs, two mature generalist 
equity crowdfunding platforms (Vismara, 2016). Both are London-based and are typically 
viewed as the UK’s most active equity crowdfunding platforms. Together, they accounted for 
over 85% of all equity crowdfunding activity in 2016, with 134 deals for Crowdcube and 124 
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deals for Seedrs. Both platforms are hence roughly similar in terms of market dominance. 
Crowdcube and Seedrs are also comparable in terms of the number of unique website 
visitors, with 146,454 and 147,650 monthly visitors, respectively (data from 
similarweb.com). Both platforms also require a minimum investment of £10 and the 
investment terms are set by the entrepreneur. Crowdfunding platforms differ significantly in 
their due diligence activities (Cumming & Zhang, 2018). However, both Crowdcube and 
Seedrs have active due diligence standards. In 2015, firms had similar success rates on both 
platforms with just under 55% of campaigns meeting or exceeding their targets. This suggests 
that—on average—the crowd views firms on both platforms as roughly equally investment 
ready.  
A crucial difference between Crowdcube and Seedrs is their deal structuring. While 
Crowdcube uses a direct ownership structure, Seedrs uses a nominee structure. During much 
of the timeframe of our study, entrepreneurs themselves could not choose for a different 
shareholder structure on a specific platform (i.e. both on Crowdcube and Seedrs there was no 
choice option).10 This differentiation in deal structuring has been emphasized in the media 
and business press and was highlighted as a key distinction between both platforms by their 
respective founders.11 
Under the direct ownership model, used by Crowdcube, the investors simply hold a 
direct equity investment in the firm. Depending on the presence of a possible investment 
threshold, they may receive A-shares with voting and preemptive rights when they invest at 
or above the threshold or receive B-shares without voting and preemptive rights when they 
invest below the threshold (Cumming et al., 2017). Crowdcube does not recommend any 
shareholders’ agreement for the crowd. Under the nominee structure, however, used by 
Seedrs, voting right and direction power over the crowds’ shares are held by the nominee.  
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In the case of Seedrs, Seedrs Limited acts as the nominee. This means that the 
management board of Seedrs Limited consents on behalf of all individual shareholders. 
Seedrs does not appoint external nominees. It is the entire board that reviews and agrees on 
the decisions that come to Seedrs, as nominee, in relation to the portfolio companies. These 
decisions result from the subscription agreement between Seedrs and their portfolio 
companies. Each subscription agreement can be slightly different, but it will generally 
include consent rights in order to protect the investors. These consent rights cover things like 
winding-up the company, issuing preference shares, transferring assets out of the company, 
making certain loans or increasing director salaries beyond an agreed level. This means that a 
firm that has raised investment through Seedrs does not have to manage several individual 
investors, as Seedrs Limited is authorized to take votes and issue consents on behalf of each 
Seedrs investor. 
 This difference in deal structure between both platforms further has implications for 
the fee structure they employ. Crowdcube and Seedrs do not charge a fee to entrepreneurs 
who want to list on their platforms. Crowdcube charges a success fee of 7% (excl. VAT) on 
the amount firms successfully raise. Seedrs uses a two-layered fee structure. First, they also 
charge a success fee, which equals 6% of the amounts firms successfully raise, and there is a 
£2,000 completion fee (excl. VAT). Second, on investments held by Seedrs as the nominee, 
Seedrs charges a fee of 7.5% on any value realized (at an exit) in excess of the capital 
invested. Seedrs does not charge any management fee for acting as nominee. This second 
component of Seedrs’ two-layered fee structure—similar to the “carried interest” in the 
venture capital setting (Gompers et al., 2009)—ensures that the interests of Seedrs (as a 
nominee) are aligned with those of crowd investors. 
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Data Sources and Samples 
We combined multiple data sources. We started from the current websites of Crowdcube and 
Seedrs. Next to both platforms’ current websites, we used multiple online resources, 
including the Wayback machine and TechCrunch, to reconstruct the population of ECF 
firms.12 Using additional data sources is important because not all previously funded equity 
crowdfunding campaigns are archived on both platforms’ current websites. Once we 
collected the ECF firms and their identifiers, we collected accounting data on these firms up 
to 2017. Disclosure requirements in the UK require privately held firms to publish annual 
accounting data on Companies House. We use Companies House as our primary data source 
to collect longitudinal accounting data on all of our sample firms from the year before the 
equity crowdfunding campaign up to 2 years after the campaign. Patent data is collected from 
Orbis Europe (formerly: Amadeus)—a database that comprises data on more than 2 million 
UK firms and a product of Bureau Van Dijk (BvD). BvD obtains the patent data from the 
PATSTAT database, a worldwide database that contains bibliographical and legal status 
patent data and is maintained by the European Patent Office. 
 We start with the population of 260 UK firms that received equity crowdfunding on 
Crowdcube and 225 UK firms that received equity crowdfunding on Seedrs during the period 
of 2012 to 2015 (inclusive). The sample selection process was based on several steps. First, 
consistent with our focus on equity crowdfunding in entrepreneurial firms, we excluded firms 
active in real estate. Second, we also excluded non-UK firms that applied for equity 
crowdfunding. This selection step helps us to further reduce the heterogeneity that may arise 
in reporting requirements and regulation across countries. Finally, we excluded firms that 
never filed financial statements. We retained 250 unique firms that raised equity 
crowdfunding.  
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ECF-NECF matched sample. To construct the matched sample, we started from 
Orbis Europe. We first identified those firms that raised capital, but did not do so through 
equity crowdfunding (i.e. NECF firms). A capital increase is defined as a net change in 
capital from period t-1 to t, normalized by the capital in period t-1, in excess of 5% (Brav, 
2009). We used a minimum threshold for the absolute amount of capital raised that equals the 
minimum equity financing amount of the ECF sample. We excluded firms that raised equity 
crowdfunding from Crowdcube, Seedrs or any other platform. We then used the coarsened 
exact matching and nearest neighbor matching algorithm (e.g., Bertoni et al., 2015) to select 
NECF firms that are similar to our ECF firms and raised capital in the same year. We perform 
all matching with replacement since Abadie and Imbens (2012) argue that this reduces 
possible biases. Accordingly, we matched each ECF firm based on its industry classification 
(i.e. Fama & French industry code), firm size (i.e. total assets), firm age (i.e. years since 
incorporation), firm performance (i.e. profit or loss scaled by total assets) and intangible 
assets ratio (i.e. intangible assets to total assets) in the year of the first equity crowdfunding 
campaign (e.g., Puri & Zarutskie, 2012). We collected longitudinal data from Companies 
House and Orbis Europe on these matched NECF firms up to 2017 as well. Together, this 
yielded a sample of 205 ECF and 205 NECF firms because it was not possible to find a good 
match for all ECF firms. 
One particular concern with comparing ECF and NECF firms is distinguishing 
selection from causation. As King and Nielsen (2016: 1) argue, the matching procedure that 
we use:  
“is an increasingly popular method for preprocessing data to improve causal 
inferences in observational data ... The goal of matching is to reduce imbalance in the 
empirical distribution of the pre-treatment confounders between the treated and 
control groups ... The resulting process amounts to a search for a data set that might 
have resulted from a randomized experiment but is hidden in an observational data 
set. When matching can reveal this “hidden experiment,” many of the problems of 
observational data analysis vanish.”  
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However, matching does not allow us to perfectly distinguish selection from causation (see 
also Puri & Zarutskie [2012], who are confronted with similar issues when comparing 
venture capital-backed and non-venture-capital-backed firms). However, it does allow us to 
make claims about differences between ECF and NECF firms (and between ECF firms 
financed through a direct ownership structure and ECF firms financed through a nominee 
structure) that are similar on specific observable characteristics (e.g., industry, firm size, firm 
age, firm performance and intangible asset ratio) at the time (one of the) firms receives equity 
crowdfunding. Thus, “simple” selection on these observable variables is unlikely to explain 
our results. But more subtle selection on unobservable variables may still matter.  
Another commonplace concern with longitudinal data, particularly on new firms, is 
survivorship bias and sample attrition. In our data collection approach, however, we used 
multiple data sources to ensure that we capture all ECF firms funded through Crowdcube and 
Seedrs, irrespective of their current survival status. Some firms could fail very quickly after 
raising funds and this would make it impossible for us to collect accounting data on these 
firms. However, quick failures—and fraud cases—after successful crowdfunding campaigns 
are rare (e.g., Cumming et al., 2016; Mollick, 2014; Mollick & Robb, 2016). Moreover, we 
do not limit our analysis to firms that remain active during the entire time frame of our study. 
Rather, firms are included as long as their relevant data are available, thereby further limiting 
survivorship bias (e.g., Lasfer, 1997). Finally, we explicitly investigate the probability that 
ECF and NECF firms fail over time, thereby providing us additional insights into firm failure 
dynamics. It is important to note that much of our sample size decrease over time is simply a 
consequence of the very young nature of the equity crowdfunding market. Specifically, most 
firms in our sample raised equity financing in 2015. This implies that they might not have 
reported additional financial accounts for up to two years by the end of 2017 (given delays 
between the closing of financial accounts and their publishing online in Companies House). 
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ECF Direct – ECF Nominee matched sample. We further constructed another 
matched sample of ECF firms with a direct shareholder structure (funded through 
Crowdcube) and those with a nominee structure (funded through Seedrs) following a similar 
matching procedure as described above. We matched each ECF firm with a direct shareholder 
structure to an ECF firm with a nominee structure based on its industry classification, firm 
size and firm age.13 This yielded a second sample of 125 ECF firms with a direct shareholder 
structure and 125 ECF firms with a nominee structure.14 Given the limited number of ECF 
firms with a direct (nominee) shareholder structure, we did not add profitability and 
intangible assets ratios as additional matching variables because this would have reduced our 
sample. However, as we will detail below, both ECF firms with a direct shareholder structure 
and matched ECF firms with a nominee structure are already fairly similar in terms of 
profitability and intangible assets, even when these variables are not used as matching 
variables. 
One may wonder to what extent our results related to differences in post-investment 
financial and innovative performance between ECF firms with a direct shareholder structure 
(funded through Crowdcube) and those with a nominee structure (funded through Seedrs) 
will reflect differences in shareholder structures adopted by these platforms or rather reflect 
other potential platform effects. Two broad platform effects may be at work: selection and 
influence. With respect to platform selection effects (i.e., different platforms select or attract 
different firms), several measures ensure that these effects should be limited. First, we use a 
matched sample design (which minimizes the impact of selection effects—see also Puri and 
Zarutskie, 2012). Second, given that all projects were funded by the crowd on either one of 
the platforms, this entails that the crowd collectively assessed all projects as “investment 
ready”. Thus, our results will most likely reflect differences in platform influence effects 
between Crowdcube and Seedrs. Ultimately, these platform influence effects reflect 
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differences in the shareholder structure employed by both platforms. Indeed, by definition, 
Crowdcube is no longer involved in the firms financed through its platform post-investment. 
Rather, the members of the crowd act as individual, direct shareholders. On Seedrs, however, 
the platform still influences the firms financed through its platform post-investment, because 
the platform remains active as a nominee.  
Variable Definitions 
This study investigates the post-investment evolution of ECF and matched NECF firms. In 
this regard, we are primarily interested in the evolution of financial and innovative 
performance. 
We use two variables in our analysis to measure the evolution of financial 
performance: profitability and failure rate. A key aspect of a firm’s financial performance is 
its profitability, which we measure as the profit or loss of the year scaled by total assets. 
Davidsson et al. (2009) illustrate that early profitability in firms is important to enable future 
profitable growth. We further measure whether firms fail. We track the failure rate and 
examine whether the timing of failure differs. Avoiding failure is a key concern for 
entrepreneurs and investors in early-stage firms (Damodaran, 2009). 
To capture innovative performance, we use the intangible assets ratio and the number 
of patent applications. First, the intangible assets ratio is measured as intangible fixed assets 
(including capitalized R&D expenses and the value of patents, trademarks, and brands) scaled 
by total assets (Michaelas et al., 1999).15 Second, we use the number of patent applications. 
We further differentiate between the number of UK and non-UK patent applications and 
investigate the number of granted patents.16 
 As highlighted before, we further distinguish between ECF firms with a direct 
shareholder structure and those with a nominee structure. In a direct shareholder structure, 
each equity crowd investor becomes a legal shareholder of the firm she/he decides to support. 
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This structure has been adopted by Crowdcube (with a few exceptions). In a nominee 
structure, equity crowdfunding platforms hold and manage the shares invested in ECF firms 
on behalf of the crowd investors. The nominee (the platform) is the legal shareholder in the 
firm’s shareholder register. This structure has been adopted by Seedrs. 
 
RESULTS 
Equity Crowdfunding and Firm Performance 
Table 1 provides basic descriptive statistics on the matching variables for the ECF firms and 
matched NECF firms in the year of their equity issue (i.e. year = 0). We find no significant 
differences in industry distribution, firm age, firm size, firm performance and intangible 
assets ratio (all p > 0.10) between both groups of firms, thereby confirming the validity of our 
matching procedure. Firms are primarily active in “other industries”, “finance”, and 
“wholesale and retail”.17 The median age of both ECF and NECF firms equals 2 years. For 
both ECF and NECF firms the average (median) amount of total assets equals approximately 
£100,000 (£56,000). The average ECF and matched NECF firms are making large losses 
(ECF: -24%; NECF -14%), while the median ECF and NECF firms are break-even (ECF: 
2%; NECF 0%). This finding is consistent with recent research that shows that firms that lack 
internal funds are more likely to search for equity crowdfunding (Walthoff-Borm et al., 
2018). On average, some 3% to 4% of the assets of ECF firms and NECF firms are intangible 
assets. 
 
In Table 2, we start by exploring the financial performance of ECF and matched 
NECF firms. We focus on two dimensions of financial performance and first discuss firm 
profitability before discussing firm failure. Post-campaign, there are no significant 
differences in firm profitability between the average (median) ECF and NECF firm (all p > 
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0.10). Both the average ECF firm and matched NECF firm keep accumulating significant 
losses over time. The median ECF and NECF firms are break-even, with a jump in median 
profitability for ECF firms in the year after the campaign. The distribution of quartiles of firm 
profitability, however, provides interesting insights. On the one hand, the ‘best’ performing 
ECF firms (Q3) realize notably higher profits than the ‘best’ performing NECF firms over 
time. On the other hand, the ‘worst’ performing ECF firms (Q1) realize dramatically larger 
losses than the ‘worst’ performing NECF firms over time.18 These findings suggest that while 
some ECF firms perform particularly well, other perform particularly poorly. 
The above results on firm profitability should be interpreted with care because firms 
are included as long as their relevant data are available (and failed firms will no longer report 
financial accounts). The failure rate is significantly higher among ECF firms than NECF 
firms. The failure rate by December 2017 is 17% for ECF firms and 2% for matched NECF 
firms. Thus, the failure rate for ECF firms is 8.5 times higher than for matched NECF firms. 
Combined, these findings provide no support for hypothesis H1a.  
 
In Table 2, we further explore the innovative performance of ECF and matched NECF 
firms. We focus on two dimensions of innovative performance and first discuss the intangible 
assets ratio before discussing patent data. Post-campaign differences in intangible assets 
ratios between ECF and NECF firms are not statistically significant (all p > 0.10). Moreover, 
pre-campaign, there are no differences in mean patent applications between ECF and NECF 
firms. However, from the year of the campaign and in post-campaign years, ECF firms 
generally exhibit significantly more patent applications than NECF firms. By December 
2017, 17 ECF firms applied for patents compared to only 5 NECF firms. Moreover, 8 ECF 
firms are granted one or more patents compared to only 2 NECF firms. Thus, 3.4 times more 
ECF firms have patent applications, and 4 times more ECF firms have patents granted 
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relative to matched NECF firms. These findings provide supporting evidence for hypothesis 
H1b.  
Shareholder Structures (Direct vs. Nominee) and Firm Performance 
Table 3 provides basic descriptive statistics on the industry distribution, firm age, firm size, 
firm performance and intangible assets ratio of the ECF firms in the year of their first 
campaign (i.e. year = 0), where we make a distinction between ECF firms with a direct 
shareholder structure and those with a nominee structure. Differences between both groups 
are not significant (p > 0.10). In both groups, firms are mostly active in “other industries”, 
“finance”, and “wholesale and retail” as described above. For both groups, the median firm is 
2 years old and has just above £100,000 in total assets. Taken together, these results confirm 
the validity of our matching process. 
Although we did not match on firm performance and intangible assets ratio when 
differentiating between distinct types of ECF firms, due to the smaller subsamples, there are 
no substantial differences in terms of these variables. The average (median) profitability is 
very negative for both ECF firms financed through a direct shareholder structure and those 
financed through a nominee structure. ECF firms with a nominee structure make smaller 
losses than those with a direct shareholder structure, but the difference is only marginally 
significant (p = 0.07). In terms of intangible assets ratio, the average ECF firm with a direct 
shareholder structure has 8% of intangible assets to total assets; those with a nominee 
structure have 5% of intangible assets to total assets. This difference is not significant (p > 
0.10).  
 
In Table 4, we compare the financial and innovative performance of ECF firms with a 
direct shareholder structure and those with a nominee structure. With regard to financial 
performance, 2 years after the campaign, average (median) losses are substantially larger for 
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ECF firms with a direct shareholder structure relative to those with a nominee structure (p < 
0.10 and better). When we look at the cumulative failure ratio up to December 2017, we see a 
difference between ECF firms with a direct shareholder structure (12%) and those with a 
nominee structure (17%), although this difference is statistically insignificant (p > 0.10). This 
finding, combined with the significantly worse profitability in year 2 of ECF firms with a 
direct shareholder structure (see especially the low performance at Q1) suggests that many of 
these firms are in financial distress (but did not fail yet). Combined, these findings provide 
supporting evidence for hypothesis H2a.  
 
For the innovative performance, we find that while ECF firms with a direct 
shareholder structure have significantly higher average intangible assets ratios in year -1 
compared to ECF firms with a nominee structure, this result tends to reverse in year 2. 
However, contrary to our first observation and our expectations, ECF firms with a direct 
shareholder structure exhibit a stronger patent application activity than ECF firms with a 
nominee structure. This difference is already evident before the campaign, but the difference 
further widens over time. Indeed, from the year of the campaign up to December 2017, ECF 
firms with a direct shareholder structure have 90 new patent applications relative to 18 new 
patent applications for those with a nominee structure. Finally, it is interesting to note that the 
patenting activity of ECF firms with a direct shareholder structure is oriented more 
internationally (i.e. non-UK), while for ECF firms with a nominee structure almost all patent 
application activity relates to UK patents. Overall, these findings provide no support for 
hypothesis H2b. 
Robustness Tests 
To assess the robustness of our results we perform several additional tests. First, to test 
hypotheses H1a and H1b, we construct a matched sample of NECF firms based on a sample 
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of firms that raised capital, but did not do so through equity crowdfunding. An alternative 
comparison can be made with a matched sample of NECF firms based on a random sample of 
firms (that excludes ECF firms, but is representative of the average firm in the UK economy). 
The latter approach has been common, for instance, in studies that compare venture capital-
backed and non-venture capital-backed firms (Puri & Zarutskie, 2012). We use this 
alternative matching group to demonstrate that our results are independent of the chosen 
matching group.19 For each ECF firm, we select a NECF firm from the random sample that is 
similar in terms of industry, firm age, firm size, firm performance and intangible assets ratio. 
Our results (detailed tables are not reported due to space considerations) remain qualitatively 
similar and are even stronger. More specifically, we fail to find a difference in the 
profitability of ECF firms and NECF firms but ECF firms have significantly higher failure 
rates than NECF firms. Thus, we again fail to find support for hypothesis H1a. Next, we find 
that post-campaign, ECF firms have significantly larger intangible assets ratios than NECF 
firms. Moreover, ECF firms exhibit significantly higher rates of patent applications than 
NECF firms. Combined, this evidence again supports hypothesis H1b.  
Second, to test hypotheses H2a and H2b, we also test for differences between ECF 
firms financed through a direct or nominee shareholder structure before February 2015. We 
do so to address the concern that some entrepreneurs could choose between a direct and 
nominee shareholder structure on Crowdcube after February 2015. We find further support 
for the same hypotheses as in our primary results; that is, ECF firms financed through a 
nominee shareholder structure make smaller losses, yet ECF firms through a direct 
shareholder structure have more new patent applications, including foreign patent 
applications.20 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
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In this paper, we examine the relationship between equity crowdfunding, shareholder 
structures, and firm performance. For this purpose, we use a longitudinal dataset of UK ECF 
firms that we track from the year before the equity crowdfunding campaign up to two years 
thereafter and a matched sample of NECF firms that raised other sources of capital. Several 
important findings emerge from our study.  
First, we fail to find a difference in post-campaign profitability between ECF and 
NECF firms, after matching ECF and NECF firms on profitability (among other variables) in 
the year of raising capital. Interestingly, on average, ECF firms generate large losses in the 
year of their campaign (and so do the matched NECF firms, unsurprisingly). Contrary to our 
expectations, however, ECF firms do exhibit significantly higher failure rates than NECF 
firms. Combined, these findings suggest that despite the unique selection mechanisms 
embodied in equity crowdfunding platforms (i.e. the wisdom of the crowd), important 
adverse selection issues remain in equity crowdfunding markets. However, we do find that 
ECF firms outperform matched NECF firms on innovative performance. Specifically, ECF 
firms exhibit stronger patenting application activity relative to matched NECF firms. Thus, 
equity crowdfunding platforms also serve as a catalyst for innovative activities. 
Our findings that ECF firms have a higher patenting activity, but also exhibit higher 
failure rates than NECF firms, do neither imply that patents are “bad” and ECF firms make 
wrong managerial decisions, nor that patents can be interpreted as a “bad” signal to crowd 
investors. Our findings do suggest that the average ECF firm exhibits higher patenting 
activity relative to the average NECF firm, despite the fact that more ECF firms fail and 
those failed ECF firms can by definition no longer apply for patents. Moreover, it is 
important to acknowledge that our study focuses on the short-term outcomes of ECF and 
NECF firms. As the equity crowdfunding market develops, additional insights might emerge 
on the longer-term outcomes.  
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Second, we consider two different shareholder structures in equity crowdfunding (i.e. 
direct and nominee shareholder structures), which allow us to study the influence of 
shareholder dispersion on firm performance in equity crowdfunding. ECF firms financed 
through a nominee structure make smaller losses relative to matched ECF financed through a 
direct shareholder structure. These findings provide evidence that nominee shareholder 
structures in equity crowdfunding are positively associated with firm financial performance, 
which may be a consequence of the increased power and incentives of nominees to monitor 
management and the lower coordination costs. For firm innovation, however, we find that 
ECF firms with direct shareholder structures focus more on patenting and have more 
international patent applications relative to their matches with nominee structures, which may 
be a consequence of selection but also the increased feeling of belonging of direct 
shareholders and thus their increased input in the innovation trajectory of firms. Overall, 
these findings provide nuanced evidence on the role of ownership dispersion in equity 
crowdfunding. 
Academic Contributions 
This paper makes several academic contributions. First, we contribute to the entrepreneurial 
finance literature. While many studies have focused on traditional outside sources of equity 
financing (such as venture capitalists and angels), we still lack research on new alternative 
sources of financing (Cumming & Vismara, 2017) and equity crowdfunding in particular 
(Vismara, 2016, 2018). Still, equity crowdfunding is fundamentally different from traditional 
equity financing. While equity crowdfunding relies on the wisdom of the crowd, professional 
investors rely on detailed due diligence to select firms. Moreover, crowd investors are 
typically less involved in firms relative to traditional equity investors, but they do provide 
other non-financial benefits, such as feedback and market validation. We find a mixed set of 
results for ECF firms; their financial performance is generally worse, while their innovative 
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performance is better than that of NECF firms. Overall, we have provided first-time evidence 
on the performance of ECF firms using a matched control sample. 
Second, we provide new insights on the role of governance structures in equity 
crowdfunding. Our limited understanding of corporate governance in equity crowdfunding is 
unfortunate considering that raising equity crowdfunding may represent a double-edged 
sword. Indeed, the wisdom of the crowd represents a core aspect of equity crowdfunding, but 
it may involve some challenges, such as agency and coordination costs related with having 
many potential crowd investors, that need to be considered. Understanding the role of direct 
shareholder and nominee structures in equity crowdfunding, and particularly how they affect 
firm performance is hence important. We further provide first-time evidence on how 
governance structures may affect ECF firms. We provide a nuanced picture, suggesting that 
both direct shareholder and nominee structures have their advantages and disadvantages for 
firm financial and innovative performance, respectively.  
Limitations and Avenues for Future Research 
As with any research, our study has limitations that could serve as important starting points 
for future research in the equity crowdfunding domain. 
 First, while our matched sample approach allows us to make claims about differences 
between ECF and NECF firms (and between ECF firms financed through a direct ownership 
structure and ECF firms financed through a nominee structure) that are similar on specific 
observable characteristics, we cannot perfectly distinguish selection from causation. Still, our 
approach is similar to the state-of-the-art in more mature fields of research such as venture 
capital (see for instance Puri & Zarutskie, 2012; if anything, we use an even stricter set of 
matching variables). Nevertheless, as more data becomes available in the equity 
crowdfunding context, future research that uses other econometric techniques to disentangle 
selection from causation in equity crowdfunding markets would be valuable. 
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 Second, we have compared ECF firms financed through Crowdcube that uses a direct 
shareholder structure and ECF firms financed through Seedrs that uses a nominee structure. 
However, equity crowdfunding platforms are also characterized by other differences in terms 
of platform design and governance (Hornuf & Schwienbacher, 2018). Future research that 
examines a broader set of platforms and differences in platform design can again provide 
valuable contributions to the literature.  
 Third, our study has used a maximum of two years of post-campaign data. Future 
studies that use a longer timeframe to examine the effects of equity crowdfunding are 
definitely warranted. However, for now, we report primarily on the short-term effects due to 
a lack of data, given the recent emergence of the equity crowdfunding market. When more 
data becomes available scholars will be able to provide more insights into the longer-term 
effects of raising crowdfunding. 
 Finally, much research in equity crowdfunding has focused on one specific context, 
the UK. With Brexit, it will be interesting to monitor the evolution of the UK crowdfunding 
market. Moreover, differences in formal institutions (including equity crowdfunding 
regulations) and informal institutions (such as cultural differences) call for more research on 
how ECF firms evolve in different countries.  
Practical Contributions 
Our study has important implications for policymakers. Supported by tax incentives, equity 
crowdfunding has grown to be an important financing alternative for entrepreneurial firms 
that struggle to access mainstream finance (Walthoff-Borm et al., 2018). In the wake of a 
number of recent anecdotal equity crowdfunding successes and failures, it is important to 
expand our broader understanding of the relationship between equity crowdfunding, 
shareholder structures, and firm performance. This research suggests that adverse selection 
issues remain important in the equity crowdfunding context, but that equity crowdfunding 
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eventually also serves as a catalyst for firm innovation activities. Crowd investor protection 
against adverse selection issues will be important to ensure the sustainability of the equity 
crowdfunding market (e.g., Akerlof & Shiller, 2015). For policymakers, it also remains 
important to further monitor the performance of those firms that access equity crowdfunding 
markets in order to take timely corrective actions when equity crowdfunding markets fail to 
deliver their promise of providing access to finance for viable businesses. 
Also for equity crowdfunding platforms, our findings provide important insights. It is 
troublesome that failure rates of ECF firms are multiple times higher than those of NECF 
firms. While failure is commonplace in the entrepreneurial setting, it suggests that platforms 
can step up their due diligence efforts to further reduce such failures. Moreover, while many 
platforms already actively inform their visitors of the riskiness of equity crowd investing, 
they can further highlight best practices that amateur investors can pursue to minimize risks 
(such as taking a portfolio approach).  
For entrepreneurs and crowd investors, our study provides new evidence on how ECF 
firms perform in the short term. Our results suggest that raising equity crowdfunding is only a 
first step for entrepreneurs, but is often insufficient to ensure firm survival in the face of 
intense evolutionary pressures. Fortunately, within the group of surviving ECF firms, some 
also exhibit high profitability. However, it remains the question whether crowd investors will 
eventually be able to realize gains on their investments at the time of exit.  
Concluding Note 
Using data from two UK crowdfunding platforms, we find that ECF firms have a higher 
failure rate than matched NECF firms. However, ECF firms also have more patent 
applications than matched NECF firms. Within the group of ECF firms, we find that ECF 
firms financed through a nominee structure make smaller losses, while ECF firms financed 
through a direct shareholder structure have more patent applications, including foreign patent 
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applications. These findings provide new insights into the performance of ECF firms and the 
differences in performance between ECF firms with dispersed and concentrated crowd 
shareholders. 
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NOTES 
1. Equity crowdfunding refers to “a method of financing, whereby an entrepreneur sells a 
specified amount of equity or bond-like shares in a company to a group of (small) investors 
through an open call for funding on Internet-based platforms” (Ahlers et al., 2015: 958). 
2. Drover et al. (2017) use experimental data to investigate how different forms of crowdfunding 
influence venture capitalist’s screening decisions; Hornuf and Schmitt (2017) examine failure 
rates of equity crowdfunded firms in Germany and the UK; Signori and Vismara (2018) focus 
on failures, follow-on financing, and M&A exits in equity crowdfunding. 
3. For our primary analysis, we have matched each ECF firm with a similar firm that did not 
raise equity crowdfunding (i.e. NECF firm) but raised capital from other sources. These other 
sources of capital generally include entrepreneurs themselves, friends or family, but can also 
include venture capital and angel investors. In a robustness test, we have also matched each 
ECF firm with a similar firm from a random sample of firms that did not attract 
crowdfunding. We describe our matching procedures in more detail in the Method section 
below. 
4. Others, however, have argued that the wisdom of the crowd is unlikely to hold in equity 
crowdfunding (e.g., Isenberg, 2012). They point out that early-stage investment is 
intrinsically complicated and that amateur crowd investors do not have the skills required to 
distinguish a good from a bad venture. Moreover, they argue that herding behavior may 
impair the crowd’s judgment. Despite these counterarguments, Mollick (2014) and Cumming 
et al. (2016) illustrate that crowdfunding has significant fraud immunity and that sharing 
information on crowdfunding platforms serves to self-correct the “foolishness” of the crowd 
(Hood, 2014). 
5. This common wisdom is also confirmed in our sample of NECF firms that raise other sources 
of capital. Specifically, only 1% of NECF firms raised venture capital. 
6.  It may seem that professional investors could easily exploit the crowd; however, such 
behavior could have important repercussions for the professional investors. Specifically, 
legitimate grounds to be unhappy or dissatisfied may push the crowd to take their “story” to 
the Internet or the media. This may not only impact the crowdfunded firm’s reputation but 
also the reputation of the professional investor. 
7. Many of the rights and protections are found in the Companies Act 2006, which is a primary 
source of law for companies in the UK. In a number of places, the protections are subject to 
modifications in companies’ articles of association, so the 2006 Act must always be 
considered alongside the statutes of the company.  
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8. See ss. 303-306 Companies Act 2006. 
9. See s. 994 of the Companies Act 2006. 
10. It is important to note, however, that Crowdcube more recently made changes in the possible 
shareholder structures adopted on its platform. These changes provide entrepreneurs with 
more flexibility to choose between a direct shareholder structure and a nominee structure. 
More specifically, from the launch of Crowdcube until February 2015, by selecting 
Crowdcube as their crowdfunding platform, entrepreneurs automatically selected a direct 
shareholder structure as well. After February 2015, Crowdcube provided nominee services as 
well, but only for firms raising over £250,000. For this service, Crowdcube charges additional 
fees. Crowdcube still favors a direct shareholder structure, however. But dependent on the 
investment size, entrepreneurs can now choose between the direct or nominee shareholder 
structure on Crowdcube. Still, in 2015, we are aware of only 2 cases that adopted a nominee 
structure on Crowdcube and these cases are not included in our study. By selecting Seedrs as 
their crowdfunding platform, entrepreneurs themselves select a nominee shareholder 
structure. 
11. See, for example: http://www.whatinvestment.co.uk/clash-of-the-crowdfunding-platforms-
crowdcube-and-seedrs-debate-which-model-is-best-for-investors-2399532/ 
12. The Internet archive Wayback Machine enables scholars to capture, manage and search 
collections of digital content. It hence allows scholars to go back in time and capture 
historical data from websites. 
13. Matching on firm age controls for two effects: (a) it ensures that the firms are founded in the 
same year and (b) it ensures that firms raised crowdfunding in the same year. We could also 
match on the time of the crowdfunding campaign (+/- 6 months) but this criterion by itself 
would imply that these firms could have a different age at the time of the campaign (and a 
firm that is 1 versus 10 years old is also very different, albeit raising crowdfunding in the 
same month). We could further extend this approach by then also adding another matching 
variable: firm age. However, adding more matching variables by definition decreases fit on 
the other matching variables (industry, size). Our approach also ensures consistency between 
the first part of our paper (where we compare ECF and NECF firms and the NECF firms do 
not have a crowdfunding campaign date by definition) and the second part of our paper 
(where we focus on differences within the group of ECF firms). 
14. The sum of the number of ECF firms financed through a direct shareholder structure and a 
nominee structure in this sample is higher compared to the total number of ECF firms in our 
previous sample. There are several reasons for this difference. First, for our second matched 
sample, we started our matching approach again from the full sample of ECF firms. In the 
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previous matched sample, for some ECF firms, we did not find a good match to a NECF 
firms. These ECF firms were hence dropped. Second, we use several ECF firms with a 
nominee structure multiple times as a match for distinct ECF firms financed through a direct 
shareholder structure. This procedure allows for decreasing bias (Abadie & Imbens, 2012) 
because “control” firms that look similar to many “treated” firms can be used multiple times. 
15. UK accounting standards allow firms to capitalize the R&D expenses as intangible fixed 
assets; or maintain the policy to write the R&D costs off to the profit and loss (Collings, 
2015). This flexibility obviously entails a shortcoming of the intangible assets ratio. Still, the 
validity of this measure has been established in previous research (e.g., Degryse et al., 2012). 
Moreover, we supplement the intangible assets ratio with alternative innovation measures (i.e. 
patent applications). 
16. We also looked at patent citations and cited patents. However, patent citations and cited 
patents are extremely rare for our samples. Indeed, firms first need to apply for patents before 
they get granted (several years later) and can get cited. Accordingly, we focus on the number 
of patent applications as one measure for innovative performance. 
17. The “other industries” category includes goods- and services producing activities and 
business support service activities. The “finance” category includes activities auxiliary to the 
finance industry; data processing, hosting and related activities; and computer programming, 
consultancy and related activities. Classification is based on the Fama and French industry 
classification, which is developed to link existing SIC groups based on 4-digits to various 
industries. 
18. Still, the S.D. of profitability in years 1-2 is lower among ECF firms. This finding is due to 
one extreme observation in the NECF group (with a low performance of -4.42 and -6.73 
respectively). Because, the S.D. is more subject to such extreme observations than an analysis 
of the quartiles, we refrain from drawing strong conclusions from the S.D. It is also worth 
noting the strikingly low mean value for ECF firms in year -1, which is also due to some 
“extreme” observations. For example, the total assets of one such observation was £4,320 in 
year -1. Therefore, the relatively large losses of this firm (£ -107,855) relative to its small 
amount of assets resulted in a highly negative profitability ratio. Nonetheless, when removing 
these few observations, the mean profitability of ECF firms in year -1 is still significantly 
different from the mean profitability of NECF (Mean ECF = -0.814, p=0.002). 
19. These different approaches have no impact on our tests within the group of ECF firms (i.e. 
hypotheses H2a and H2b). 
20. Detailed results of these tests are not reported here but are available on request. 
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TABLE 1 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE ONE-TO-ONE SAMPLE OF ECF FIRMS AND NECF FIRMS THAT RAISED OTHER SOURCES OF CAPITAL 
 
ECF NECF ECF NECF p ECF NECF p
Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services 0.10 0.11 Median 2.00 2.00 0.85 Median 0.02 0.00 0.79
Finance 0.26 0.27 Mean 2.18 2.21 0.83 Mean -0.24 -0.14 0.83
Other industries 0.57 0.55 SD 1.56 1.59 SD 1.18 1.06
Manufacturing 0.02 0.02 Number of firms 205 205 Number of firms 205 205
Consumer Non Durables 0.02 0.02
Intangible assets
ECF NECF p ECF NECF p
Median 55,208 58,294 0.33 Median 0% 0% 0.62
Mean 99,571 111,365 0.37 Mean 3% 4% 0.37
SD 127,417 137,452 SD 12% 13%
 Number of firms 205 205 Number of firms 205 205
ratio





Notes. The sample includes UK entrepreneurial firms that raised equity crowdfunding (ECF firms) between 2012 and 2015 (inclusive) for the first time on 
Crowdcube or Seedrs. These firms were matched to UK firms that raised other sources of capital in the same year (NECF firms). These other sources of 
capital include entrepreneurs themselves, friends or family, but can also include venture capital and angel investors. The matching variables include 
industry, firm age, firm size, profitability and intangible assets ratio. The table shows the industry distribution (Fama and French industry classification) of 
both samples and the descriptive statistics for firm age (years since founding), firm size (total assets in £), firm profitability (profit or loss on total assets) 
and intangible assets ratio (intangible fixed assets on total assets, %). With respect to the industry distribution: “other industries” includes goods- and 
services producing activities and business support service activities. We use a cut-off, so that industries representing less than 2% of the sample are not 
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TABLE 2 
FINANCIAL AND INNOVATIVE PERFORMANCE FOR ECF FIRMS AND MATCHED NECF FIRMS THAT RAISED OTHER SOURCES OF CAPITAL 
Profitability
ECF NECF Diff ECF NECF Diff ECF NECF Diff ECF NECF Diff
Median -0.06 0.00 *** 0.02 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.01 0.01
Mean -2.89 -0.24 *** -0.24 -0.14 -0.20 -0.31 -0.58 -0.52
SD 6.17 1.71 1.18 1.06 1.25 1.30 1.75 1.90
Q1 (25%) -2.33 -0.22 -0.45 -0.24 -0.53 -0.26 -0.78 -0.20
Q3 (75%) 0.21 0.18 0.59 0.51 0.65 0.28 0.55 0.30
Number of firms 138 157 205 205 176 185 76 138
Failures 
ECF NECF Diff ECF NECF Diff ECF NECF Diff ECF NECF Diff ECF NECF Diff
Failure rate 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 *** 0.17 0.02 ***
Number of failures 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 1 35 4
Number of firms 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 205
Intangible assets ratio
ECF NECF Diff ECF NECF Diff ECF NECF Diff ECF NECF Diff
Median 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Mean 3% 5% 3% 4% 4% 5% 6% 4%
SD 13% 18% 12% 13% 15% 14% 20% 12%
Number of firms 138 157 205 205 176 185 76 138
Patent Data
ECF NECF Diff ECF NECF Diff ECF NECF Diff ECF NECF Diff ECF NECF Diff.
Median 0.00 0.00 * 0.00 0.00 ** 0.00 0.00 ** 0.00 0.00 ** 0.00 0.00 **
Mean 0.21 0.09 0.36 0.13 † 0.38 0.15 † 0.38 0.15 † 0.39 0.16 †
SD 0.99 0.69 1.49 1.01 1.60 1.07 1.60 1.07 1.63 1.20
Number of firms 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 205
Number of firms with patent applications 17 5
Number of firms with granted patents 8 2
Total number of patent applications 79 33
Total number of patents granted 10 7
Year -1 Year 0 Year 1 Year 2
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 2017
Year -1 Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 2017
Year -1 Year 0 Year 1 Year 2
Year - 1
 
Notes. This table reports the financial and innovative performance of ECF firms and matched NECF firms that raised other sources of capital. The 
profitability measure is winsorized at the 5% level. The overall failure rate and patent data are measured at the end of December 2017. The significance 
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level for the differences in median and mean between both groups are reported.  †, *, **, *** report significant levels at the 10%, 5%, 1%, and 0.1% 
levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 3 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE ONE-TO-ONE SAMPLE OF ECF FIRMS WITH DIRECT SHAREHOLDERS AND NOMINEE STRUCTURE  
Direct Nominee Direct Nominee p Direct Nominee p
Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services 0.13 0.13 Median 2.00 2.00 0.28 Median -0.78 -0.42 0.11
Finance 0.15 0.15 Mean 2.26 2.38 0.24 Mean -1.65 -1.18 0.07
Other industries 0.64 0.64 SD 1.71 1.5 SD 2.26 1.79
Manufacturing 0.05 0.03 Number of firms 125 125 Number of firms 125 125
Consumer Non Durables 0.02 0.02
Direct Nominee p Direct Nominee p
Median 114,954 103,932 0.27 Median 0% 0% 0.16
Mean 202,549 179,016 0.44 Mean 8% 5% 0.23
SD 260,917 222,361 SD 17% 17%
Number of firms 125 125 Number of firms 125 125
Year 0
Year 0 Intangible assets Year 0Size
ratio
Industry distribution Age ProfitabilityYear 0 Year 0
 
Notes. This table relates to the one-to-one matched sample of ECF firms with direct shareholder structure and ECF firms with nominee structure. The 
matching variables include industry, firm age and firm size. The table shows the industry distribution (Fama and French 12 industries classification) for the 
distinct types of ECF firms, and the descriptive statistics for firm age and firm size (total assets in £). The table also provides additional descriptive data on 
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TABLE 4 
FINANCIAL AND INNOVATIVE PERFORMANCE FOR ECF FIRMS WITH DIRECT SHAREHOLDER AND NOMINEE STRUCTURE 
Profitability
Direct Nominee Diff Direct Nominee Diff Direct Nominee Diff Direct Nominee Diff
Median -0.68 -0.09 ** -0.78 -0.42 -0.77 -0.66 -0.41 -0.16 †
Mean -1.54 -1.01 ** -1.65 -1.18 † -1.49 -1.56 -0.66 -0.28 **
SD 2.10 1.73 2.26 1.79 2.19 2.56 0.80 0.57
Q1 (25%) -2.12 -1.28 -1.87 -1.38 -2.30 -1.44 -1.27 -0.20
Q3 (75%) -0.04 0.00 -0.22 -0.11 -0.18 -0.02 0.00 0.00
Number of firms 91 98 125 125 91 72 30 33
Failures
Direct Nominee Diff Direct Nominee Diff. Direct Nominee Diff Direct Nominee Diff Direct Nominee Diff
Failure rate 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.12 0.17
Number of failures 0 0 1 0 4 7 6 10 15 21
Number of firms 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125
Intangible assets ratio
Direct Nominee Diff Direct Nominee Diff Direct Nominee Diff. Direct Nominee Diff.
Median 0% 0% *** 0% 0% 0% 0% *** 0% 0%
Mean 13% 3% *** 8% 5% 10% 5% 8% 13%
SD 25% 13% 17% 17% 22% 20% 18% 32%
Number of firms 91 98 125 125 91 72 30 33
Patent Data
Direct Nominee Diff Direct Nominee Diff Direct Nominee Diff Direct Nominee Diff Direct Nominee Diff
Median 0.00 0.00 ** 0.00 0.00 ** 0.00 0.00 ** 0.00 0.00 ** 0.00 0.00 **
Mean 0.61 0.03 * 0.85 0.03 * 1.13 0.15 * 1.30 0.15 * 1.33 0.18 *
SD 3.03 0.36 3.79 0.36 5.46 0.84 6.00 0.84 6.05 0.98
Number of firms 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125
Number of firms with patent applications 16 4
Number of firms with patents granted 7 1
Total number of patents granted 16 1
Total number of patent applications 76 4 106 4 141 19 162 19 166 22
Total number of foreign patent appl. 31 0 46 1 51 1 52 1 52 1
UK patent rate 0.59 1.00 *** 0.57 0.75 *** 0.64 0.95 *** 0.68 0.95 *** 0.69 0.95 ***
Foreign patent rate 0.41 0.00 *** 0.43 0.25 *** 0.36 0.05 *** 0.32 0.05 *** 0.31 0.05 ***
Year -1 Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 2017
2017
Year -1 Year 0 Year 1 Year 2
Year -1 Year 0 Year 1 Year 2
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2Year -1
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TABLE 4 - continued 
FINANCIAL AND INNOVATIVE PERFORMANCE FOR ECF FIRMS WITH DIRECT SHAREHOLDER AND NOMINEE STRUCTURE 
 
Notes. This table reports the financial and innovative performance of ECF firms with direct shareholders and ECF firms with nominee structure. The 
profitability measure is winsorized at the 5% level. The significance level for the differences in median and mean between both groups are reported. The 
patent success rate (end of December 2017) is measured as the percentage of patents applications that are actually granted. Foreign patent rate is the 
percentage of patents applications outside the UK.  †, *, **, *** report significant levels at the 10%, 5%, 1%, and 0.1% levels, respectively. 
 
